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A B S T R A C T
Innovation platforms (IPs) that support agricultural innovation to enable transition processes towards more
sustainable agriculture provide a space where conflicts of interest among actors in the existing agricultural
system (the so called incumbent regime) may play out. Sometimes these conflicts over how actors will benefit
from an action are not revealed until actors are brought together. However, a barrier to change occurs when IP
actors use their existing power to mobilise resources to influence if and how individual and collective interests
are aligned. In the context of agricultural innovation and transitions, this paper uses the power in transitions
framework (Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016), along with analytical perspectives on conflicts and role perceptions,
to understand how consciously staging or revealing conflicts of interest among IP actors changed role percep-
tions and power relations among these actors. The paper explores this topic in two IPs addressing agricultural
production and sustainability challenges in New Zealand's agricultural sector. Conflicts were staged in IPs when
one group of actors mobilised resources that enabled them to move existing power relations from one-sided, to
synergistic or a mutual dependency. This enabled conflicts to be acknowledged and solved. In contrast, conflicts
were not staged when actors mobilised resources to maintain antagonostic power relations. Our cases demon-
trate that staging conflicts to change actors' role perceptions is an important intermediary step to forming new
power relations in the agricultural system. Our findings highlight the need for IP theory to conceptualise power
relations in IPs as context specific, dynamic and a force shaping outcomes, rather than solely a force exerted by
actors in the incumbent regime over IP actors.
1. Introduction
There is growing recognition that innovation to support transitions
towards sustainable agriculture involves complex social, market, in-
stitutional, technical, and practice changes in the agricultural system
(Klerkx et al., 2010; Blesh and Wolf, 2014). This has contributed to
increased use of innovation platforms (IPs),1 which are a means to
connect and motivate multiple stakeholders around a common goal or
purpose (Esparcia et al., 2015; Nederlof et al., 2011; Schut et al., 2014).
These IPs bring together multiple actors in interactions seeking to shape
new long-term visions (Cullen et al., 2014; Koch, 2004) and potential
pathways to change the existing agricultural system (incumbent re-
gime) (Cullen et al., 2014; Fuchs and Glaab, 2011; Koch, 2004; Rossi
et al., 2019).
While the potential of IPs is promoted to address complex agri-
cultural challenges, such as climate change and food security, it is in-
creasingly acknowledged that these arrangements need to interact with
dominant actors from the incumbent regime (Eidt et al., 2020; Elzen
et al., 2012; Ingram, 2015; Klerkx et al., 2010; Lamine, 2011; Rossi
et al., 2019), where technological, organisational and institutional ar-
rangements support the dominant mode of agricultural production
(Ingram, 2015). Bringing these actors together in IPs provides oppor-
tunities for actors to exercise power to change or maintain existing roles
(Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016; Cullen et al., 2014; Eidt et al., 2020;
Kukk et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2015; Smink et al., 2015; Rossi et al.,
2019). For example, in an institutional diagnosis of value chain
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development from two IPs in Ghana, Osei-Amponsah et al. (2018)
found donor's interests and roles in the platform were to prioritise
business and market development, while NGOs attempted to prioritise
farmer empowerment and poverty alleviation. In this case, in order to
make use of and align with the power of donors, NGOs shifted to
prioritise market development to secure legitimacy with donors, while
continuing farmer empowerment activities (Osei-Amponsah et al.,
2018). Thus, when actors with different roles in society, such as donors,
environmental regulators, NGOs, researchers, farmers, agribusinesses
and industry organisations, participate in IPs, these arrangements can
be a space to intentionally play out conflicts of interest arising from
differences in how actors benefit or lose from changes in access, use and
distribution of resources, and hence reshape roles and power relations
leading to systemic change in the incumbent regime (El Bilali et al.,
2018; Sørensen, 2014; Rossi et al., 2019).
These conflicts are seldom acknowledged or made explicit, espe-
cially when existing power relations shape the dynamics of interactions
among IP actors, including: (i) who participates (Eidt et al., 2020); (ii)
what is in scope (Cullen et al., 2014); (iii) the extent to which joint
learning occurs (Davies, 1994; Rossi et al., 2019); and (iv) the extent to
which conflicts are mediated or suppressed (Kenis et al., 2016;
Sørensen, 2014). To suppress conflict powerful actors may, for example,
use discourse in a way that camouflages conflicts of interest among
parties as negotiations guided by consensus (Eidt et al., 2020; Neimark,
2016), potentially resulting in a situation where hidden conflicts re-
main unacknowledged and unsolved (Esparcia et al., 2015; Kenis et al.,
2016).
In the context of agricultural innovation to support transitions to
sustainable agriculture, our aim is to understand how power relations in
incumbent agricultural systems become manifested as conflicts among
IP actors, and how the conscious staging of these conflicts can reshape
individual actor perceptions of their own and other actor's roles. This
topic has, to date, received limited attention and calls have been made
for such research both in the generic literature on transitions (Avelino
and Rotmans, 2009, 2011; Smith and Stirling, 2010) and in the litera-
ture on agricultural and more broadly rural innovation (El Bilali et al.,
2018; Hinrichs, 2014; Lamine, 2011; Scoones et al., 2015; Pigford et al.,
2018; Rossi et al., 2019). Our study extends current research on power
and conflict in IPs in two ways. Firstly, institutional studies (North,
1990) of conflict in IPs engaging with smallholder development (Akullo
et al., 2018; Eidt et al., 2020; Kilelu et al., 2013; Osei-Amponsah et al.,
2018) have tended to view conflicts as a barrier to innovation to be
overcome through mediation, facilitation and negotiation (e.g., Akullo
et al., 2018), or mitigated through ethics of diversity and inclusion
(e.g., Cullen et al., 2014). We contend that a potentially transformative
role from staging conflicts of interest exists (Avelino and Rotmans,
2011; Hoffman and Loeber, 2016; Rossi et al., 2019). Sørensen (2014)
argues that staging conflicts by acknowledging and making them ex-
plicit can play a transformative role in innovation by shaping new role
perceptions and relations among actors (see also Rossi et al., 2019).
Secondly, we take a multi-actor perspective to look at how the com-
position and diversity of IPs influences staging of conflicts. While these
arrangements are often composed of actors that want to change the
existing agricultural regime; for IPs to achieve their goals, they may be
influenced by and influence actors from that regime (Elzen et al., 2012;
Klerkx et al., 2010; Pigford et al., 2018). IPs need to engage with the
regime and make connections to these actors to induce meaningful
change (Beers et al., 2014; Klerkx et al., 2010; Rossi et al., 2019); a
difficult proposition for actors embedded in the incumbent regime with
stable roles, relationships and practices (Späth et al., 2016). To date,
this process has not been widely assessed through the lens of power
(Köhler et al., 2019; Markard et al., 2012; Pigford et al., 2018). In order
to address these knowledge gaps, the analysis in this paper is guided by
three research questions to explore how power is ‘performed’ within IPs
as part of transitions:
1. How do power relations among actors in the existing agricultural
system (incumbent regime) manifest in conflicts among IP actors?
2. How do platform actors mobilise resources to stage (or hide) con-
flicts?
3. How does staging conflicts of interest in IPs influence the formation
of new role perceptions and power relations among actors in the
agricultural system?
To answer these questions, the paper draws on empirical research
involving two IPs within a New Zealand research programme, Primary
Innovation (AgResearch Limited, 2016; Pinxterhuis et al., 2018; Turner
et al., 2016; Vereijssen et al., 2017). Platform implementation included
a significant emphasis on relational processes to enable stakeholders to
learn and act together to accelerate the pace of innovation and deliver
more profitable and sustainable farming practices (King et al., 2019).
The first platform involved dairy and beef industry organisations,
grazing companies and dairy farmers and graziers, with the goal to
develop a strategy for dairy heifer rearing (Pinxterhuis et al., 2018).
The second platform involved dairy, sheep, beef and cropping industry
organisations, farmers, researchers and government, with the goal to
identify nutrient management practices to meet limits for freshwater
quality (Pinxterhuis et al., 2018).
We next introduce the framework used for analysing power dy-
namics in IPs and the incumbent agricultural regime, and subsequent
influence on role perceptions and power relations. By power dynamics
we mean the way that power relations manifest in conflicts of interest
and in turn transform (or not) actor role perceptions and power rela-
tions themselves. This is followed by a description of the case study IPs,
along with the methods used to gather and analyse the data. We then
present the results in terms of the power dynamics and potential
changes in the agricultural regime observed in the case studies. The
paper concludes with a discussion of theoretical and practical im-
plications for power dynamics within IPs.
2. Analytical framework
Studies of power dynamics in IPs, innovation and transitions in the
rural and agricultural literature has evolved over the last two decades
to provide an increasingly comprehensive and nuanced understanding
of how actor interests, resources and power relations interact to shape
transitions (see El Bilali et al. (2018) and Rossi et al. (2019) for re-
views). In this literature three ways of conceptualising power can be
found (El Bilali et al., 2018). The first is a conceptualisation situated in
the multi-level perspective (Geels, 2002); emphasising power by regime
actors over non-incumbent IP actors (e.g. Beers et al., 2014; Eidt et al.,
2020). The second is a governance-oriented conceptualisation, focused
on actor strategies and capacity to transform institutions (e.g. Mahon
et al., 2010; Osei-Amponsah et al., 2018). The third is a socio-political
and socio-material conceptualisation, emphasising material aspects of
power (e.g. Cullen et al., 2014) and how actors mobilise resources to
exercise power, such as how legitimacy of knowledge is created (Csurgó
et al., 2008; Fuchs and Glaab, 2011; Morgan and Murdoch, 2000). Our
own analytical framework bridges elements of these three traditionally
separate conceptualisations to explore how IP actors mobilise resources
to strategically exercise power to surface and address conflicts of in-
terest among regime and non-incumbent actors. Our analytical frame-
work combines three perspectives; (i) power in transitions (Avelino and
Rotmans, 2011), (ii) the transformative role of conflicts (Sørensen,
2014; Rossi et al., 2019), and (iii) actor role perceptions as an inter-
mediary for changes in power relations (Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016;
Sørensen, 2014).
2.1. Power relations
The power in transitions framework is an interdisciplinary frame-
work for studying power dynamics among actors with stable roles,
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relationships and practices in the incumbent regime, and actors seeking
to change these roles, relationships and practices. Two aspects of this
framework make it suitable for addressing our research aim. Firstly, it
encapsulates several concepts previously applied to studies of power in
IPs (Cullen et al., 2014; Koch, 2004; Swaans et al., 2013; Swan and
Scarbrough, 2005). For example, Cullen et al. (2014) used the power
cube (Gaventa, 2006) to analyse where and how power is manifest from
local to global levels in IPs for natural resource management. Swan and
Scarbrough (2005) used Hardy’s (1996) three dimensions of power to
study the politics of networked innovation in European businesses.
Other authors (e.g., Akullo et al., 2018; Osei-Amponsah et al., 2018;
Swaans et al., 2013) use institutional perspectives (e.g., North, 1990) to
analyse the presence and influence of differing interests among actors in
IPs for smallholder development. Our analytical framework brings to-
gether these separate concepts of power. Secondly, by unpacking the
resources used by actors to exercise power, the framework supports an
exploration of how actors use power to stage (or hide) conflicts of in-
terest to change (or maintain) role perceptions and power relations
(Blesh and Wolf, 2014; Hinrichs, 2014). We therefore view power as a
“force that affects outcomes” (Hardy, 1996, p. S3), rather than a force
to exert over others, as has been recommended by previous studies of
power dynamics in IPs in diverse settings (e.g., Mahon et al., 2010;
Swaans et al., 2013; Swan and Scarbrough, 2005). In the power in
transitions framework, power is defined as the capacity of actors to
mobilise resources to achieve individual and/or collective goals
(Avelino and Rotmans, 2011). For example, ‘invisible forms of power’
(Gaventa, 2006) used by smallholder farmers to resist innovations
through feigned interest, pretending to comply or sabotaging trials
(Cullen et al., 2014) or by rural advisors in Ireland to circumvent the
top-down imposition of participatory extension (Mahon et al., 2010).
This enables us to consider how platform actors may individually and
collectively use power to create (or resist) change in the existing
system.
Differences among actors in their capacity to mobilise resources,
including creating new resources (Table 1), result in different power
relations. Earlier studies of power relations in IPs have tended to miss
the ‘invisible forms of power’ exercised by mobilising natural and ar-
tifactual resources (Cullen et al., 2014) by emphasising mobilisation of
monetary (c.f. Cullen et al., 2014) or mental resources (particularly
knowledge) (e.g., Csurgó et al. (2008) in the context of sustainable
development in rural Europe, and Morgan and Murdoch (2000) for
organic and conventional agriculture value chain actors in Europe).
The capacity of actors to mobilise resources to exercise power re-
sults in the directionality of power relations. Examples of the ‘direc-
tionality of power’ include: i) an actor exerting power over another,
thereby creating a one-sided dependency, e.g. when farmers are viewed
by other IP members as ‘implementers’ rather than co-designers (Cullen
et al., 2014; Eidt et al., 2020); or ii) several actors exerting power over
each other to create antagonism, e.g. when farmers sabotage trials on
their farm because the technology trialled does not align with their
interests (Cullen et al., 2014). This depends on the extent to which one
actor has power over another and the power relation that exists
(Table 2). The typology of power relations from Avelino and Rotmans
(2011) recognises that perspectives of power over, power with and
power to, are not mutually exclusive, but are dynamic and can occur in
combination (El Bilali et al., 2018).
When actors come together in IPs they do so with individual goals
that may or may not comprehensively align with an emerging collective
goal (Swan and Scarbrough, 2005; Zadeck et al., 2008), as was observed
by Osei-Amponsah et al. (2018) for the case of differing donor and NGO
goals in two IPs in Ghana. Actors also have different capacities for
exercising power to influence how individual and collective interests
are aligned (Eidt et al., 2020; Schut et al., 2016; Swaans et al., 2013).
For example, Cullen et al. (2014) observed that three research-for-de-
velopment platforms established in the Ethopian highlands had goals
and platform membership set by the organising Government agency
prior to participation of local farmers. The typologies of resources and
power relations are therefore useful to explore the ways power relations
influence the staging of conflicts of interest among platform actors.
2.2. Staging conflicts of interest and changing role perceptions
Conflicts of interest arise when actors realise competing benefits
from adjusting their actions. Such conflicts can be transformative when
actors' experience a change in their role perceptions (Sørensen, 2014) to
reconceptualize their relation to problems they perceive (Schmidt-
Thomé and Mäntysalo, 2013; Rossi et al., 2019). The extent that this
staging occurs is influenced by actors' mobilising resources to exercise
power to challenge current role perceptions (Sørensen, 2014; Rossi
et al., 2019). Role perceptions are the traditional images actors have of
themselves and of each other in the incumbent regime (Sørensen,
2014). Aspects of the regime are reproduced by individuals in different
roles, and these individuals may support the incumbent regime in some
contexts, but want to change it in other contexts (Avelino and
Wittmayer, 2016; Rossi et al., 2019). For example, farmers from dif-
ferent industries (livestock and cropping) may try to cooperate to in-
crease productivity, but have opposing interests in the face of en-
vironmental issues (Fielke and Bardsley, 2015).
In summary, our analytical framework conceptualises the connec-
tion between IP power relations and role perceptions in the regime. We
especially focus on the way actors mobilise resources to stage (or hide)
conflicts of interest in the IP and how this transforms role perceptions
and power relations (Fig. 1).
3. Case description and methods
This section describes the New Zealand agricultural system (in-
cumbent regime), which is the focus for this study, and outlines the case
study IPs addressing challenges facing the agricultural system.
3.1. New Zealand's agricultural regime
New Zealand's existing agricultural system reflects technological,
organisational and institutional arrangements oriented predominantly
towards modes of production that increase productivity while reducing
farming's impact on the environment. For example, the dairy industry's
productivity is viewed as needing to increase to “maintain and enhance
the industry's competitiveness” (Morriss et al., 2006). In response,
sector actors started pursuing competitive enterprises and industries in
the global market (Le Heron and Roche, 1999). This has resulted in the
intensification of agricultural production and cumulative negative im-
pacts for surrounding environments, especially waterways (Myles et al.,
2016). In this situation, the central government has sought to establish
environmental regulations for land and water uses, including farming
practices, such as the National Policy Statement – Freshwater Man-
agement (NPS-FM), which will set catchment-level limits on freshwater
use and quality (New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2014).
3.2. Innovation platforms
The primary data for this study were collected from stakeholders
participating in two New Zealand IPs addressing agricultural
Table 1
Typology of resources to exercise power. Source: Avelino and Rotmans (2011).
Resource type What is mobilised
Mental Information, concepts, ideas, beliefs
Human Personnel, members, voters
Artifactual Apparatuses, products, construction, infrastructure, art
Natural Raw materials, physical space, time, organic life
Monetary Funds, cash, capital
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production and sustainability challenges related to; (i) heifer rearing,
and (ii) nutrient management (Rijswijk et al., 2015; Pinxterhuis et al.,
2018). The first created a space for industry organisations and farmers
to interact and negotiate efficient ways to mobilise resources and skills
to increase the live weight of dairy heifers. The second brought together
cropping, sheep, beef and dairy farmers, industry organisations and a
regional council (Environment Canterbury; local government re-
sponsible primarily for regional environmental regulation) to support
farmers to meet future environmental regulations by reducing nitrate
leaching.
Both platforms were initiated from the regime, and while their
transformative ambitions were not as great as those documented in
studies on sustainability transitions (Diaz et al., 2013; Hermans et al.,
2016; Ingram, 2015; Lamine, 2011), the IPs did aim to alter the in-
cumbent regime (Srinivasan et al., 2019).
3.2.1. Heifer rearing
In 2013, the heifer rearing project was initiated and funded by
DairyNZ (an industry body that represents all dairy farmers in New
Zealand and can levy these farmers to undertake industry-good activ-
ities). This project was developed in response to industry data in-
dicating that 73 per cent of heifers entering the national herd were at
least 5 per cent below target weight (McNaughton and Lopdell, 2012).
This represented an estimated national loss of NZD120 million per
annum in farm profit across the dairy industry (Brazendale and Dirks,
2014), through decreased milk production and increased animal
rearing costs. Many heifers are reared off-farm by a third party (for
example a grazier who runs a business rearing young dairy animals),
often on more marginal land (Brazendale and Dirks, 2014). Graziers
may take young dairy stock to provide additional income to their sheep
and beef farming enterprise or as specialist heifer graziers. The other
main groups involved in the project were Beef and Lamb NZ (another
industry-good body), the Livestock Improvement Corporation (LIC, a
dairy farmer-owned co-operative providing genetics expertise, in-
formation and technology to the dairy sector), grazing companies, dairy
farmers and graziers. This IP worked on the strategy for the heifer
rearing industry, with a focus on resource development, relationship
management between interested parties, and development of an alter-
native model for pricing heifer rearing.
3.2.2. Nutrient management
The nutrient management IP brought together several initiatives. In
2012 Environment Canterbury, which is directed by the NPS-FM to
establish limits for freshwater quality, set up a project to inform nu-
trient management processes and assess compliance of agricultural
practices in the Canterbury region: the Matrix of Good Management
(MGM). In this platform, Environment Canterbury worked with in-
dustry organisations and businesses (DairyNZ, the Foundation for
Arable Research, Beef and Lamb NZ, the fertiliser industry, the seed
industry and processors). Environment Canterbury also worked with
five research organisations to identify farm practices to reduce nitrate
leaching. Another initiative in the platform was Forages for Reduced
Nitrate Leaching (FRNL), begun in 2013. DairyNZ-led FRNL, sought to
develop practical options for farmers in the arable, sheep, beef, and
dairy industries to reduce nitrate leaching by 20 per cent by 2020.
3.3. Data collection and analysis
For each case study purposive semi-structured interviews with
farmers, researchers, and individuals from industry and a regional
council involved with the IPs were undertaken between April 2015 and
July 2015, in accordance with previous work utilising the case study
method (Ingram, 2008). This was not the first interaction with the IPs.
Previous engagement included workshops and benchmarking inter-
views to build an initial understanding of power dynamics in each case.
Eight individuals from the heifer rearing IP and ten from the nutrient
management IP participated in the interviews (Table 3). Two inter-
viewers separately undertook the interviews. Each interview took be-
tween one and 2 h. All the participants were asked the same interview
questions. The questions explored their perceptions of actor interac-
tions in the project, understanding of individual actor (and overall
project) interests and goals, conflict among actors, and changes in role
Table 2
Typology of power relations. Source: Avelino and Rotmans (2011).
Power relation
type
Manifestation of power relations
Power ‘over’ Mutual dependency – A has power over B but B
also has power over A
One-sided dependency – A has power over B but B
does not have power over A
Independency – A and B have no power over each
other
‘More/less’ power Cooperation – A exercises more power than B,
but A and B have similar collective goals
Competition – A exercises more power than B,
while A and B have mutually exclusive goals
Co-existence – A exercises more power than B, A and
B have independent co-existent goals
‘Different’ power Synergy – A's and B's different power enable and
support one another
Antagonism – A's and B's different power restrict,
resist or disrupt one another
Neutrality – A's and B's different power do not
(significantly) affect one another
Fig. 1. Relationship between staging conflicts of interest and changes in actor role perceptions and power relations in the incumbent regime.
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perception. Each interviewee is referred to by their code in Table 3,
particularly when direct quotes are used.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed, provided to inter-
viewees who had requested a copy of the transcript for review, and then
coded by the second and third authors for analysis using the analytical
framework as the coding structure (Tables 1 and 2, and Fig. 1). The
second author conducted thematic analysis of the coded interviews
(Merriam, 2009) to identify recurring themes across interviewees and
explored links among these themes.
4. Findings
4.1. Heifer rearing
There were two groups of individuals identified in the heifer rearing
project; (i) dairy farmers and graziers, and (ii) organisational re-
presentatives from the industry bodies (DairyNZ and Beef + Lamb NZ)
and commercial agricultural companies (LIC, dairy graziers). The
former group experienced changes in role perceptions and power re-
lations while the latter group did not. The experiences of the IP actors
from these two groups illustrate a contrast in staging conflicts in IPs
(Figs. 2 and 3).
4.1.1. Power relations
At the start of the project dairy farmers wanted heifers with greater
live weights for improved reproductive performance, while graziers
wanted to make a living and produce healthy animals. At this time
demand for heifer grazing outstripped supply as there was a shortage of
land for grazing heifers. A dairy farmer (HR4) explained how this
characterised power relations between dairy farmers and graziers:
“They [dairy farmers] don't want to turn round and upset the grazier
because he might say well there's 10 other guys willing to come in
here and be happy with me, so why should I change. So it is hard to
try to get everyone to adapt to the same level.”
Graziers were therefore perceived as having one-sided power over
dairy farmers (Table 2) as they were able to negotiate the contract
conditions for rearing heifers. This was compounded by dairy farmers
and graziers rarely discussing weight gain targets or formalising agreed
targets in the contracts.
An industry body representative (HR1) explicitly recognised the
power relations between industry-good bodies (DairyNZ and
Beef + Lamb NZ) and commercial agricultural companies (LIC, grazing
companies) in the sector. Commercial companies had priorities to
protect commercially sensitive information and their on-going business
interests, while industry-good bodies had a responsibility to make the
most of resources to support farmers. From an industry-good body
perspective, HR3 stated that some organisational representatives would
not stay in the project if the project did not serve their organisational
priorities. From HR6's perspective of a commercial company, the si-
tuation was that “things were said and indicated that because we were
‘commercial’ our view was somehow less valid”. These observations illus-
trate how different organisational priorities resulted in antagonistic
power relations (Table 2), as illustrated by the following quote by a
private consultant in the project (HR8):
“In this project we have DairyNZ which is an industry-good orga-
nisation that doesn't have any commercial imperatives directly.
Then you have LIC who do have some public good stuff but they also
have very high profit, they have to make money to exist … so all
these people have different goals and business motives.”
Therefore, even though the organisations involved in the project
had a common vision of increasing the number of heifers reaching
target weights, and could agree on some of the tools to enable this goal,
issues regarding resourcing could not be resolved.
Table 3
Interview participants in the heifer rearing (HR) and nutrient
management (NM) cases.
Code Organisation
HR1 Industry body
HR2 Industry body
HR3 Industry body
HR4 Dairy farmer
HR5 Beef & sheep farmer (grazier)
HR6 Agricultural company
HR7 Agricultural company
HR8 Private consultant
NM1 Industry body
NM2 Industry body
NM3 Industry body
NM4 Industry body
NM5 Industry body
NM6 Regional council
NM7 Agricultural company
NM8 Agricultural company
NM9 Research organisation
NM10 Research organisation
Fig. 2. Changing power relations and role perceptions among graziers and dairy farmers.
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4.1.2. Conflicts
As part of their involvement in the IP, dairy farmers and graziers
began to create mechanisms to support dairy farmer and grazier
agreement on heifer live weights targets. This involved conflicts of in-
terest between them. Both dairy (HR4) and sheep and beef (HR5)
farmers acknowledged the role of conflicts to tease out the best out-
come. A facilitator played an important role in making conflicts explicit
enough that dairy and sheep and beef farmers could cooperate, agree on
a process for setting weight targets, and develop similar terminology.
In contrast, the existing conflicts among the industry organisation
representatives were not staged, as illustrated by an agricultural com-
pany participant (HR6):
“We get better if we can all innovate and do our things and as long
as we're all on the same page and we're not conflicting and we're
helping lift performance nationwide, then that's a good thing and
none of us should be held back by the other partners in the process.”
This suggests that the agricultural companies and industry-good
bodies can pursue different priorities while sharing an overarching
goal. At the same time, HR6 expressed that this attitude towards co-
operation can be perceived as competitive by others in the IP.
4.1.3. Role perceptions
The different experiences of staging conflict between dairy farmers
and graziers, and among industry-good and commerical organisations,
is reflected in how individuals experienced changes in role perceptions.
There was a new role perception shared by dairy farmers and graziers.
In staging conflicts, the IP was experienced as “a new space” (HR4) and
“a blank page” (HR5) in which dairy farmers and graziers realised their
synergistic power relations (Table 2).
In terms of the industry organisations, an agricultural company
representative (HR7) provided a contrasting example:
“It is a result of perhaps unclear expectations of the role and un-
realistic timeframes, short term versus medium term. And perhaps
issues about leadership and who is leading here and who's reporting
to who and who gets to go to what meetings, do they have any
speaking rights?”
Other examples also revealed how power relations between in-
dustry-good bodies, and commercial companies influenced the way
these organisations mobilised resources. For example, DairyNZ had the
mandate and funding to lead the project, while some organisations had
information for commercial use. The group of dairy farmers and gra-
ziers expected that industry organisations would cooperate to make the
most of these resources by changing the resource distribution to reduce
overlaps. However, individuals from the industry organisations main-
tained their existing role perceptions, and power relations among or-
ganisational representatives remained antagonistic.
4.2. Nutrient management
Observations from the nutrient management case illustrate that
power relations between the environmental regulator (Regional
Council) and sector stakeholders (industry-bodies) changed after they
staged out existing conflicts (Fig. 4), while conflicts among groups to be
regulated (industry-bodies and farmers from different agricultural sec-
tors) were not staged out, resulting in no change in role perceptions or
power relations (Fig. 5).
4.2.1. Power relations
The initial role of the Regional Council as implementer of en-
vironmental regulations contributed to a lack of negotiation regarding
how the Regional Council would use data in environmental regulation
design. This data had been collected by industry-bodies to support
farmer decision-making to increase farm productivity. Industry-bodies
also experienced Regional Council power over them in setting time-
frames for meeting environmental regulations and the use of science
data for setting policy to regulate on-farm environmental activities.
From an industry perspective, an agricultural company representative
(NM8) expressed that the national and regional regulators mobilised
their mandate to implement policies and use of science data for policy
setting:
“The Regional Councils have determined that there's a number in
there that we have to meet or not exceed and all of a sudden this tool
which we've been able to use as a guide or an indication of the trend
now has become a black and white number and it was never de-
veloped for that.”
4.2.2. Conflicts
The one-sided power relations between the Regional Council and
industry stakeholders shifted from one-sided to mutual dependency
when the industry stakeholders gained new science data that the
Regional Council did not have, but needed. An industry-body re-
presentative (NM1) explained this process:
“They [people in the regional council] kept the MGM project quite
separate from policy they said ‘you produce a matrix, a table and the
Fig. 3. Unchanging power relations and role perceptions among industry-good organisations and commerical agricultural companies.
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numbers and we can decide what we do with it’ and we kept pushing
back saying ‘okay now we're interested in those numbers as well
we're working on that but we don't know if we want to give it to you
because we don't know what you're going to do with it’. So finally
they gave in and they've now got a policy working group where
they've got several people from Environment Canterbury across all
their sections like the consenting process, planning people involved
in that group and people from industries.”
Having this science data increased the power of sector stakeholders
in the regulatory process to stage out conflicts and negotiate how farm-
level science data was used in environmental regulation and the time-
frames for implementing regulations.
From the perspective of the Regional Council, NM6 explained the
difficult position to mediate the tension between national policies and
the agricultural sector regarding environmental issues:
“The requirement to maintain or improve and to set limits is con-
strained by the regional and national conversation or the outputs
from that conversation.”
In response to this situation, the Regional Council sought to amend
“an incredibly unrealistic timeframe for delivery” (NM6) set in national
policy. To do this the Regional Council mobilised their resources, such
as influential employees, to negotiate timeframes with national reg-
ulators. In this way the Regional Council mediated the relationship
between national policy and regional sector stakeholder interests.
Another conflict in the IP was among industry-bodies and research
organisations competing over who receives attribution for assisting
farmers. In addition to this tension there were conflicts around the di-
rection of the project and levels of commitment expected of each other.
Furthermore, dairy, sheep and beef farming sectors experienced con-
flicts over who contributed most to environmental issues, as a regional
council representative (NM6) explained:
“Dairy farmers tend to have the same soil type, uniform farming
system across the platform. Whereas on a sheep and beef farm they
are growing all sorts of crops. That paddock had fattening lambs on
a few weeks ago and you now grow potatoes on it. So it's much
harder for them to see what good management practice would look
like in that context.”
While these conflicts among agricultural sectors existed in the
project, an industry body representative (NM1) stressed the fact that
the new programme, FRNL, which was led by DairyNZ and funded by
the government enhanced the sense of collaboration among individuals
in the project. In a way, the group of sector stakeholders mobilised their
Fig. 4. Changing power relations and role perceptions between environmental regulators and sector stakeholders.
Fig. 5. Unchanging power relations and role perceptions among industry-bodies and farmers.
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monetary, artifactual and mental resources to enhance their capacity to
stage out conflicts with the Regional Council.
4.2.3. Role perceptions
Role perceptions of individuals in the project, such as environ-
mental regulators and the ones to be regulated, changed through sta-
ging conflicts. The Regional Council developed a perception of their
role as an intermediary between national regulators and sector stake-
holders. This suggests the changes in power relations through mobi-
lising resources and staging of conflicts between regulators and sector
stakeholders can change role perceptions of regulators.
A research organisation representative (NM10) indicates that
farmers share a similar sense of collaboration while dealing with ten-
sions among, arable, sheep and beef, and dairy sectors:
“The arable sector, the beef and lamb sector and the dairy sector are
working together and there is some alliance. However as soon as
there is a bit of stress they tend to go run back to what is comfor-
table. But they are seeing the benefits of that working together so I
think it's a healthy thing and part of the process.”
This conflict was not staged and shared role perceptions in relation
to dealing with the environmental issues did not emerge among the
agricultural sectors involved in the project.
5. Discussion
The aim of this paper was to understand how power relations in the
incumbent agricultural regime may manifest as conflicts of interest
among actors in IPs, and how the staging of these conflicts can trans-
form actor role perceptions and power relations. To address this aim we
sought to answer three questions:
1. How do power relations among actors in the existing agricultural
system (incumbent regime) manifest in conflicts among IP actors?
2. How do platform actors mobilise resources to stage (or hide) con-
flicts?
3. How does staging conflicts of interest in IPs influence the formation
of new role perceptions and power relations among actors in the
agricultural system?
Overall, our findings suggest gradual staging of conflicts in IPs can
transform role perceptions and power relations among actors in the
incumbent system. Existing power relations in the incumbent system
and the mobilisation of resources can be used by platform actors to
actively stage (or hide) these conflicts to either change (or maintain)
role perceptions and power relations in the regime.
To answer our first question, the cases demonstrate that power re-
lations among actors in the regime can, in one context, manifest as
conflicts of interest among IP actors, while in another context these
power relations did not manifest in conflicts. For example, industry
organisations mobilised resources to maintain existing power relations
and continue to compete in addressing heifer rearing productivity.
However, in nutrient management, industry organisations mobilised
their resources to stage conflicts with the environmental regulator to
influence the use of industry science data and timing of regulation.
Therefore, our cases support previous findings by Esparcia (2014) and
Ingram (2015) that the way actors make sense of different contexts in
the regime influences if and how they use existing power relations and
mobilise resources to stage or hide conflicts of interest.
In answer to our second question, in both cases, staging conflicts
involved actors mobilising resources to transform power relations
among platform actors. Thus conflicts influence how incumbent re-
gimes are maintained or transformed depending on how actors in IPs
mobilise resources to exercise power to stage (or hide) conflicts. As has
previously been observed by Cullen et al. (2014) in the context of
farmer participation in natural resource management IPs, our cases
showed that conflicts of interest were staged in IPs when one group of
actors mobilised resources that enabled them to move power relations
from one-sided, to synergistic or a mutual dependency. In the nutrient
management case, the Regional Council mobilised the mandate to im-
plement national environmental policy to exercise one-sided power as
regulators over the regulated. This power relation moved to mutual
dependency when industry organisations mobilised new science data to
stage conflicts with the Regional Council. In contrast, as has been
previously found by Totin et al. (2018) and Eidt et al. (2020), conflicts
were not staged when actors mobilised resources to maintain antag-
onostic or one-sided power relations. For example in heifer rearing,
industry organisation representatives mobilised different resources such
as funding for the project and commercial information, to exercise
power over each other to protect their own interests. These findings
highlight previous authors' (Cullen et al., 2014; Avelino and Rotmans,
2011; Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016; Rossi et al., 2019) calls for the
need to conceptualise power relations in IPs as dynamic and a force
shaping outcomes rather than solely a force exerted over others.
In answer to our third question, both IPs provided a potential space
to gradually stage conflicts of interest that exist in the regime. However,
a barrier to changing the regime occurred when actors used existing
power relations and mobilised resources to maintain existing role per-
ceptions. For actors that staged conflicts their role perceptions changed.
In heifer rearing, dairy farmers and graziers staging conflicts led to new
shared role perceptions to coordinate increasing dairy heifer live
weights. Our cases therefore support Avelino and Wittmayer (2016)
and Sørensen (2014) by demonstrating that staging conflicts can
transform actors' role perceptions leading to new innovation pathways.
We next discuss some theoretical and practical implications of our
findings, which provide new insights regarding the role of IP actor
composition and power relations in stimulating change in the incum-
bent agricultural regime.
5.1. Implications for innovation platform theory
Previous research on IPs (e.g. Eidt et al., 2020; Cullen et al., 2014;
Esparcia, 2014; Nederlof et al., 2011) has tended to conceptualise
power as residing in the external institutional environment and as an
inhibitor to the change ambitions of IP actors. Under this con-
ceptualisation a suggested solution to addressing power is the equal
participation, negotiation, and agreement among IP actors. This may,
however, mask power relations in an illusion of participation (Cullen
et al., 2014; Rossi et al., 2019). To respond to this some (e.g., Cullen
et al., 2014; Swaans et al., 2013; Totin et al., 2018) have highlighted
the need to recognise how incumbent actors, through setting platform
membership and agendas, their own participation (or not) in platforms,
reduce IP potential to transform the regime. A priori identification of
potential conflicts using methods such as those cited by Hermans
(2008), Ditzler et al. (2018) and Thiel et al. (2015) can help to unmask
power relations when forming IPs. Others (e.g., Beers et al., 2014;
Klerkx et al., 2010; Totin et al., 2018) have highlighted the need for IP
actors to continuously assess their institutional environment and re-
interpret their activities. Innovation brokerage and reflexive monitoring
may provide some foundations on which to build practice that is more
cognisant of power relations, can respond to power residing in the re-
gime, and contest or work around it.
In contrast our cases show that including incumbent actors in IPs
has the potential to make power relations in the regime more apparent,
thus responding to Cullen et al.'s (2014) call to make power relations
visible in IPs. By including incumbent actors, IPs can potentially reveal
power relations between local and higher-levels, including structural
challenges that cause conflict (thus laying the groundwork for institu-
tional change). Therefore, like Ingram (2015) and Rossi et al. (2019),
our cases show that inclusion of incumbent actors in IPs has potential to
stimulate change in the agricultural regime, though at the same time
potentially maintaining existing power relations. Therefore, making
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power relations visible may be insufficient to stimulate more transfor-
mative change in the regime and lead to what has been referred to as a
‘fit and conform’ strategy as opposed to a ‘stretch and transform’
strategy in terms of changing incumbents' power (Hermans et al., 2016;
Smith and Raven, 2012). In both of our cases resources were mobilised
by incumbents to hide conflicts of interest and thus maintain existing
power relations and role perceptions.
A novel insight from our cases is the opportunity for platform actors
perceived as less powerful (c.f. Kukk et al., 2016) to mobilise resources
(including non-financial) to stage conflicts that address existing power
relations and open other pathways to change in the regime. For ex-
ample, industry organisations in the nutrient management case mobi-
lising scientific data they held to change process time frames set by the
Regional Council. Therefore, when conflicts in IPs are staged, rather
than hidden, they can be used to stimulate change. Rather than create
spaces and events where conflicts can be resolved (e.g. Akullo et al.,
2018; Kilelu et al., 2013), our cases suggest staging conflicts can play an
active role in transforming role perceptions. In this respect, our findings
are more in line with Hoffman and Loeber (2016) on conflict in tran-
sitions, who argue that conflicts can stimulate creativity.
Our case studies show it is possible to change role perceptions and
power relations in the regime when incumbent actors are included, and
platform actors can mobilise resources to stage (rather than hide)
conflicts of interest. In this way the power to change the incumbent
system can reside in IPs when incumbent actors are explicitly included
in IPs. When IP actors stage conflicts their role perceptions change and
thus they re-interpret their context. For example, the nutrient man-
agement IP started with the objective of farming practice to reduce
environmental problems. The national and regional environmental
policy makers used scientific data in a way that reinforced the view that
problems and solutions exist in farming practices. When the group of
sector stakeholders gained new science data and created a space to
stage conflicts, these conflicts served to change the project objective.
The outcome was recognition that the wider institutional context also
needed to change to enable farmers to respond to environmental issues.
Our two cases demonstrate that this change in role perceptions re-
quires platform actors to mobilise resources to stage conflicts of in-
terest, rather than incumbent actors using existing power relations in
the regime to hide conflicts. As has previously been observed, incum-
bent actors may mobilise resources to actively create conflicts of in-
terest to change the regime (Kukk et al., 2016) or prevent these conflicts
to maintain existing power relations (Smink et al., 2015; Pel, 2016;
Späth et al., 2016).
5.2. Implications for innovation platform practice
In terms of the implications for IP practice, the question is how to
facilitate actor interactions so that the inclusion of incumbent actors
supports the staging of conflicts of interest to form new role perceptions
and power relations, rather than to reinforce or magnify existing power
relations? Incumbents (as in the case of Kukk et al. (2016)) or non-
incumbents seeking change in the regime can mobilise (or create) re-
sources in an IP to stage conflicts and transform role perceptions. For
example, sector stakeholders in the nutrient management IP mobilised
the use of scientific data they owned. Those facilitating IP interaction
must be open to situations where incumbents mobilise resources to hide
conflicts. For example, industry organisations in the heifer rearing IP.
The analytical framework presented in this paper can provide a struc-
ture to help platform facilitators to reflect on power dynamics among
platform actors and the strategies used to prevent staging of conflicts
(e.g., Smink et al., 2015; Pel, 2016; Späth et al., 2016). This is needed to
avoid innovation pathway capture by incumbents (Späth et al., 2016).
Our findings thus go beyond the call for including spaces for ne-
gotiation in IPs (Akullo et al., 2018), by demonstrating a useful ana-
lytical framework for understanding how existing power relations and
the mobilisation of resources contribute to staging (or hiding) conflicts
among platform actors. Complementing the power in transitions fra-
mework with perspectives on conflicts and role perceptions as they
emerge can help to observe how actors interact with the regime by
exercising different types of power and mobilising resources to stage (or
hide) conflicts. Similar to Rossi et al.’s (2019) highlighting the need to
create what they call ‘enabling relational environments’, this enables an
understanding of how exercising power and mobilising resources in IPs
may or may not result in staging conflicts and changing role percep-
tions. Of critical importance is recognising that the same actors may
exercise power to change role perceptions in one context, while seeking
to maintain existing roles and power relations in other contexts. Hence,
this denotes a power mobilisation ambiguity where incumbents may be
both change agents as well as maintainers of the status quo (Späth et al.,
2016). This has previously been observed by Fielke and Bardsley (2015)
who refer to different interests of the same actor groups in different
contexts (e.g., farmers in different regions of Australia) or different
actor groups in the same context (e.g., farmers and consumers am-
bivalence toward animal welfare). As in our cases the same actor groups
bring different interests (and resources) to IPs in different contexts.
Actors have particular role perceptions, exercise different types of
power, and form different groups in IPs. Together these contribute to
the characteristics of power dynamics. For actors, detailed under-
standing of how they and others exercise power enhances the capacity
of IPs to deal with evolving relations not only as face-to-face power
struggles between individuals but also power relations that actors face
in their interactions with the regime. Practical methods for revealing
and reconfiguring power relations are difficult to apply in practice
because power is often hidden. Nonetheless, a range of tools for facil-
itators (e.g. van Mierlo et al., 2010) could expose and interrogate power
relationships in IPs as they emerge. However, the outcomes may be
affected if the forces that hold the exisiting system stable are stronger
than the desire for change. In short, further understanding of stabilising
forces and disrupting forces are needed.
6. Conclusion
This paper conceptualised conflicts in IPs as manifestations of power
relations in the wider incumbent regime. The experiences in the two
cases provide examples to illustrate how actors, as part of the agri-
cultural regime, mobilise resources to reinforce or change their power
relations and role perceptions through staging (or mitigating) conflicts.
Our cases demonstrated that IPs can become a space for making explicit
power relations and conflicts of interest that exist in the regime. When
facilitators of IPs more actively use staging as a way to make conflicts of
interest and power relations visible IP actors could successfully trans-
form role perceptions and re-interpret their context in ways that can
open up new innovation and transition pathways.
A main implication for IP theory is the need to move the con-
ceptualisation of power from a force exerted by actors in the incumbent
regime over IP actors to power relations in IPs as context specific, dy-
namic and a force shaping outcomes. An implication for IP practice is
the importance of recognising that power relations in the regime appear
differently in specific contexts and that conflicts may need to be staged
to unpack power relations and role perceptions in these different con-
texts.
There is a tension between IPs as maintaining and changing agri-
cultural regimes, with struggles amongst actors, between actors and
their organisations, and between the safe space of the IP and the or-
ganisational environments individuals come from. Given this tension
IPs should not be seen as universally leading to regime transformation.
Our analytical framework is useful for actors to better understand the
nature of power relations, conflicts and role perceptions so that plat-
form actors may enhance the potential to collectively influence the
agricultural regime through changes in power relations and role per-
ceptions.
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